A second objective, particularly for Study 2, was to study in more detail than ever the factors related to the basic decisions of non-professionals. The individual`s perception of the most likely grounds for a particular dispute is likely influenced by both contextual and individual factors. Contextual factors include variables such as the characteristics of the subject or area in which the dispute arises, any information about the parties to the dispute, or the content or basis of the dispute. The finding  of contextual differences between the secular reasons for biology and history could, for example, reflect the perceived differences between these two disciplines or between the natural and human and social sciences. In this study, we only looked at contextual factors in order to vary the subject. However, we propose that the influence of individual differential factors may work differently depending on the case of litigation. This is especially true for ideology/worldview and conspiracy thought effects (see below), as they are activated to a lesser extent or to a greater extent depending on the subject. These three characteristics pose great challenges to effective communication of science in the event of controversy and are discussed successively in the following sections. In any event, the debate is based on examples from the research literature and highlights implications for both communicators and future research. These results also provide an overview of why one reason might be preferred over another.
We find a mixed model of global and specific impact on the assessment of fundamental probability. Both political ideology and the idea of conspiracy have shown global effects (transmitted by the credibility of science) on probability assessments of all reasons for scientific conflict. This indicates that lay people who regard science as unbelievable do not systematically make judgments of reason, as is a reason in one case. If this were the supplement, we would only expect specific evaluation models. For example, bias would be seen as a factor that makes scientists clearly unbelievable, especially for those who also prefer conspiracy ideas. Competence could be considered secondary, even if all scientists are considered incompetent, some being considered more competent than others, which perhaps makes them a little less credible. Finally, complexity would be seen as a reason that has nothing to do with the qualities of the scientists themselves and therefore with credibility. These global effects, whatever the type of reason, imply that it is more a sign of general distrust – “knowing what I do about scientists, any explanation of their differences of opinion might be valid” – rather than an explanation of the basic choice.