In the confused history of relations between the United States and Europe and NATO and NATO and the EU, Berlin Plus seemed to propose a reasonable compromise to “do more”, in a way that does not undermine NATO, and, on the other hand, the ambitions of European countries to play a greater role in their own defense, This is a matter of the State of affairs commission, from the Committee on Budgets, from the Committee on Budgets, on the other side. The views expressed above reflect the views of the author, should not be attributed to any institution to which he or she is related, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. So far, the EU, with NATO support, has carried out two operations: the agreements are called after a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin in 1996, when they declared their readiness to facilitate “the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the Western European Union”. At its 1999 Washington summit, NATO, on the basis of the Berlin decision, recognised “the European Union`s determination to have the capacity to act autonomously” and extended the agreements to the EU. Hence the most. On behalf of the EU, Xavier Solana wrote on 17 March 2003 to NATO Secretary General George Robertson to confirm that work on Berlin Plus between the two organisations had been completed. But something is missing. The most practical and traditional framework for cooperation between the EU and NATO, the “Berlin Plus”, seems to have been neglected. Under Berlin Plus, agreed in 2003, the EU can request NATO to make its resources and capabilities available to the EU for a targeted EU-led operation.
In the absence of any mention of Berlin Plus in recent NATO or EU public documents, it would appear that this form of cooperation has been marginalized in favor of seemingly more contemporary topics. . . .